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SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND THE PUBLIC POLICY
EXCEPTION IN CHOICE-OF-LAW: DOES IT
REALLY EXIST?
By Barbara J. Cox*
I have been working with Evan Wolfson at Lambda Legal Defense
and Education Fund in developing a practice manual for attorneys who
will bring marriage recognition cases once same-sex couples win the
right to marry in Hawaii. (Even if the Baehr v. Miike' case does not
result in a finding that the marriage statutes in Hawaii are unconstitu-
tional, some state will, at some point in the near future, permit us 2 to
marry.)3 With the help of Jeff Gibson, then Chair of the American Bar
* Professor of Law, California Western School of Law. I would like to thank the following
people and institutions for their help with this project Andrea Schheider-Noriega, Sheila Sullivan,
and Jennifer Whitko, my research assistants; Evan Wolfson and Brian Jacobson from Lambda
Legal Defense and Education Fund; Jeff Gibson, Mary Benauto, and the numerous attorneys, law
professors, and law students who are assisting in this research project; California Western School
of Law's publication support program; Sandy Murray, Elizabeth Johnson, and Mary Ellen Norvell
in faculty support; and my partner, Peg Habetler. I would also like to publicly thank Evan
Wolfson, not only for his help on this project, but also for the incredible work that he has been
doing to obtain the right to marry for same-sex couples. When we one day obtain that right, it will
be in no small part a result of the vision and the work that Evan has done.
1. When the Hawaii Supreme Court first decided it, the case was known as Baehr v. Lewin,
852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). Baehr commenced that action against John C. Lewin, then State Direc-
tor of Health. Following the 1994 general election, Governor Cayetano appointed Lawrence H.
Miike to succeed Lewin as Director and, pursuant to Appellate Procedure Rule 43(c)(1), Miike
was substituted for Lewin as a named defendant in the case. Baehr v. Miike, 910 P.2d 112, 112
n.1 (1996). Trial in the case, following the Hawaii Supreme Court's remand, began September 10,
1996 in front of Circuit Court Judge Kevin S.C. Chang. The trial resulted in a decision in favor of
the plaintiffs and is now on appeal to the Hawaii Supreme Court. Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394,
1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Dec. 3, 1996).
2. Consistent with a significant discussion occurring in feminist and other "outsider" com-
munities, I subscribe to the "anti-essentialist" tenet that there are no outside observers when ana-
lyzing issues. "It is important to reflect upon your own location in relation to the issue and the
people under discussion, because your perspective necessarily affects the way you perceive and
the way you are perceived by others." Nitya Duclos, Some Complicating Thoughts on Same-Sex
Marriage, 1 LAW & SEXUALrrY 31, 40 (1991). My perspectives include my years teaching femi-
nist theory and sexual orientation theory as a law professor, my years spent as a community activ-
ist working for the recognition of gay and lesbian families, my years as an "out" lesbian, and my
years involved in a long-term relationship with my partner, Peg Habetler, following our commit-
ment ceremony in 1992.
3. A state will do that, if not for the "right" reason of recognizing that gay and lesbian
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Association's Section on Individual Rights and Responsibilities, and
Mary Bonauto from the New England Gay and Lesbian Advocates and
Defenders, we organized a group of over seventy attorneys, law profes-
sors, and law students from around the country who have been doing
in-depth research, using a checklist that we developed, asking for infor-
mation on each state's marriage validation statutes, marriage evasion
statutes, choice-of-law theory, prior marriage recognition cases, and full
faith and credit cases.4 At this point, we have received research for
thirty-two states. As the research comes in, I analyze it, determine what
information is still needed, have research assistants do that research,
and then we revise the material into a consistent format. While I have
read research from every state that we have received, I have not had
the opportunity until just before this conference to pull together some
of the research and determine what we have found out. While the re-
search is not yet complete, I wanted to share some of the initial find-
ings here today.
I. INTRODUCTION
For those of you who have researched in the choice-of-law field,
particularly in the area of recognition of marriages that took place
outside the forum state,5 you know that the standard explanation of
how courts handle these cases includes a public policy exception. Let
me give you a few examples. For those states that still use the First
relationships are entitled to societal and legal recognition, then for the "other" reason that Pro-
fessor Jennifer Brown has so clearly outlined. it is almost impossible for any state to resist forever
the status of "first mover" state and the $4 billion dollars that will result from that status. See
Jennifer G. Brown, Competitive Federalism and the Legislative Incentives to Recognize Same-Sex
Marriage, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 745. 752-820 (1995) (analyzing the "first mover" economic benefits
reaped from recognizing same-sex marriages).
4. Evan Wolfson, Jeff Gibson, Mary Bonauto, and I drafted the checklist and smmary of
issues that was sent to all members of the research clearinghouse. To review that checklist and
other supporting documents in this effort, see Evan Wolfson, Fighting to Win and Keep the Free-
doa to Marry: The Legal, Political, and Cultural Challenges Ahead, 1 (No. 2)
NAT'L J. OF SEXUAL ORIEr. L. (1995) <http://sunsite.unc.edu/gaylaw>.
5. For purposes of this article, I will be referring to marriages entered into out-of-state,
most likely in Hawaii, by domiciliaries of another state. I am assuming those parties went to Ha-
waii for a short stay, celebrated a marriage, and then returned to their domicile. This is the most
controversial case in which to argue for recognition. I do that here because this is the most likely
scenario for gay and lesbian couples once Hawaii legalizes same-sex marriages. For a discussion
of the "more interesting" choice-of-law question that results when Hawaiian couples who marry
leave the islands for another state and the impact that the federal Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L.
No. 104-09, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) will have on resolving this discussion, see Mark Strasser, Lov-
ing the Romer Out for Baehr: On Acts in Defense of Marriage and the Constitution, 58 U. Prrr.
L. REv. 279 (1997).
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Restatement of Conflict of Laws, determining whether to recognize a
marriage includes two steps. Under section 121, the rule of lex loci
celebrationis would apply; in other words, a marriage that is valid
where celebrated is valid everywhere! In discussing section 121, com-
ment d states that because the law of the domicile governs the domestic
status of marriage, the differences between states' marriage laws would
"lead to great difficulty, if it were not for the fact that all Anglo-Amer-
ican states agree in creating the status of marriage (except in rare cases
considered in sections 131 and 132) in every case where there is a
contract of marriage valid in the state where the contract is made."'
Under the First Restatement, denying a normal incident of marriage to
a validly married couple should be avoided unless enjoyment of that
incident "violently offends the moral sense of the community."
Under section 132, however, "a marriage which is against the law
of the state of domicil of either party, though the requirements of the
law of the state of celebration have been complied with, will be invalid
everywhere ... ,"o Although marriages by same-sex couples are not
included in the marriages listed, comment b states that the list "is not
intended to be an exclusive enumeration and if a marriage offends a
strong policy of the domicil in any other respect, such marriage will be
invalid everywhere."" This allows courts in states using the First Re-
statement to determine whether recognizing same-sex marriages offends
the forum's "strong policy."'"
6. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) [hereinafter FRST RESTATEMENT]. Fifteen
states (Alabama, Georgia, Kansas, Maryland, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming) still
use the First Restatement. Patrick J. Borchers, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: An Empirical Study,
49 WASH & LEE L. REv. 357, 357 (1992).
7. FIRST RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 121.
8. Id. § 121 cmt. d. Section 131 applies to remarriage after divorce and § 132 applies to
marriages void under domicile law. ld.
9. Charles W. Taintor, II, Marriage in the Conflict of Laws, 9 VAND. L. REV. 607, 615
(1956).
10. FIRST RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, at § 132. That section lists the following marriages
as invalid: "polygamous marriage, incestuous marriage between persons so closely related that
their marriage is contrary to a strong public policy of the domicil, marriage between persons of
different races where such marriages are at the domicil regarded as odious, [and] marriage of a
domiciliary which a statute at the domicil makes void even though celebrated in another state." Id.
11. Id. § 132, cmt. b.
12. Comment c, referring to miscegenous marriages, indicates that not only must there be a
statute prohibiting the marriage, but the marriage must also offend a "deep-rooted sense of morali-
ty predominant in the state." Id. Miscegenous marriages can no longer be prohibited, following the
Supreme Court's decision in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). Thus, even in those few states
that do prohibit marriage by same-sex couples statutorily, it is possible that those prohibitions do
not establish this "sense of morality" that would be offended. At the time of the Baehr decision,
only six states had explicit statutes prohibiting marriages by same-sex couples: Indiana, Louisiana,
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For those states that use the Second Restatement,3 section 283
controls recognition of out-of-state marriages. It states:
(1) The validity of marriage will be determined by the local law of the state
which, with respect to the particular issue, has the most significant relation-
ship to the spouses and the marriage under the principles stated in § 6.
(2) A marriage which satisfies the requirements of the state where the mar-
riage was contracted will everywhere be recognized as valid unless it violates
the strong public policy of another state which had the most significant rela-
tionship to the spouses and the marriage at the time of the marriage. 4
Thus, a court would consider whether the marriage would violate the
"strong public policy" of the state with the most significant relationship
to the spouses and the marriage at the time of the marriage. 5 The Sec-
ond Restatement clearly tends toward validation as a general rule but
also indicates a concern to protect "the interest of a State in not having
its domiciliaries contract marriages of which it disapproves."16 It
Maryland, Texas, Utah, and Virginia. Barbara J. Cox, Same-Sex Marriage and Choice of Law: If
We Marry in Hawaii, Are We Still Married When We Return Home?, 1994 WIS. L. REv. 1033,
1070 n.216-217 [Hereinafter referred to as Cox, Choice of Law]. During the recent spate of states
passing statutes to limit the impact of the Baehr decision nationally, Arizona, Delaware, Illinois,
Kansas, Michigan, and South Dakota passed statutes also explicitly prohibiting marriages by same-
sex couples. Barbara J. Cox, Are Same-Sex Marriage Statutes the New Anti-Gay Initiatives?, 2
(No. 2) NAT'L J. OF SEXUAL ORiEN L. (Jan. 1997) [hereinafter Cox, Anti-Gay Initiatives)
<http://sunsite.unc.edu/gaylaw>.
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICr OF LAwS (1971) (hereinafter SECOND RESTATE-
MENT). Borchers indicates that Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, the District of
Columbia, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebras-
ka, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, and Washington all fol-
low the Second Restatement Borchers, supra note 6, at 373 & n.l 13. Some other commentators
disagree about whether all these states follow the Second Restatement Gregory E. Smith, Choice
of Law in the United States, 38 HASTINGS UJ. 1041, 1172-74 (1987); Herma Hill Kay, Theory
into Practice: Choice of Law in the Courts, 34 MERCER L. REv. 521, 591-92 (1983).
14. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 13, § 283. Section 6 states that when no statutory
directive exists, the court should consider several factors to determine which state has the "most
significant relationship" to the marriage. Those factors include: (a) the needs of the interstate and
international systems; (b) the relevant policies of the forum; (c) the relevant policies of other inter-
ested states and the relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular issues;
(d) the protection of the parties' justified expectations; (e) the basic policies underlying the partic-
ular field of law; (f) certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result; and (g) ease in the determi-
nation and application of the law to be applied. Id. § 6(2). When a statutory directive exists, a
court will follow the directive of its own state on choice of law, subject to constitutional restric-
tions. Id. § 6(1).
15. For a discussion of how the "at the time of the marriage" language in § 283 might im-
pact a court's decision when there exists a forum state, Hawaii as the state of celebration, and a
third state which was the parties' domicile, see Strasser, supra note 5.
16. Willis L.M. Reese, Marriage in American Conflict of Laws, 26 INr'L & COMP. L.Q. 952,
965 (1977).
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would defer to the domiciliary state, as the state with the most signifi-
cant relationship to the couple, to consider whether a given marriage
violates its public policy. 7
The other two major choice-of-law theories also instruct the courts
to consider public policy in deciding whether to recognize an out-of-
state marriage by that state's domiciliaries. Governmental interest anal-
ysis, developed by Brainerd Currie in the 1950's and 1960's, refers
courts to policy considerations. 8 Currie believed that the statutory and
case law of a state express policy choices which the state has an "inter-
est" in applying to that state's domiciliaries. 9 In a situation such as
this, where the parties have a common domicile, Currie would conclude
that this was a "false" conflict. Because the domiciliary state has the
only interest in applying its law, the forum state (if different from the
domiciliary state) should apply the law of the common domicile.'
Finally, Robert Leflar's "choice-influencing considerations" theory2'
focuses on those factors that influence courts in their choice-of-law
analysis.' "Leflar's considerations include: (1) predictability of result,
(2) maintenance of interstate and international order, (3) simplification
of the judicial task, (4) advancement of the forum's governmental inter-
ests, and... (5) application of the better rule of law."' Leflar indi-
cates that "justice in the individual case" is the ultimate result to be
achieved in choice-of-law cases2' and expects that judges may be led
to use the forum's own law, especially if foreign law "might interfere
with fundamental local policies."'
All of these choice-of-law theories instruct courts to consider
public policy. The general rule which exists with an "overwhelming
tendency" in the United States is to prefer validation of marriages.'
Under this rule, marriages will be found to be valid if there is any
reasonable basis for doing so.7 Again, due to significant public policy
reasons, this rule has become entrenched in the substantive law of all
17. Cox, Choice of Law, supra note 12, at 1095.
18. BRAuIERD CURRIE, SELECrED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLCr OF LAws 187 (1963).
19. Borchers, supra note 6, at 360-61.
20. Cox, Choice of Law, supra note 12, at 1090.
21. Robert A. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations In Conflicts of Law, 41 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 26, 282 (1996).
22.. Smith, supra note 13, at 1049.
23. Id.
24. Leflar, supra note 21, at 296.
25. Id. at 298.
26. WniLiAM M. RIcmAN & WLuxm L. REYNoLDs, UNDERSTANDING CONFLICr OF LAWS
§ 116 (a) (2d ed. 1993).
27. See generally id.
states. 2s "The validation rule confirms the parties' expectations, it pro-
vides stability in an area where stability (because of children and prop-
erty) is very important, and it avoids the potentially hideous problems
that would arise if the legality of a marriage varied from state to
state.
' '29
"Despite this overwhelming tendency to validate the marriage, [a]
same-sex couple will remain unsure whether their marriage will be
recognized, due to courts' discretion to refuse recognition on public
policy grounds."" For the past several months, I have been reviewing
the research from the thirty-two states that we have in our clearing-
house at this time." My summary today focuses on two main ques-
tions:
(1) Have courts actually used public policy exceptions to refuse to recognize
out-of-state marriages entered into by their domiciliaries, or have they simply
indicated their discretion to find such an exception, without actually using a
public policy exception to refuse validation of a marriage?
(2) Have courts used marriage evasion statutes or other statutory prohibitions
to refuse to validate an out-of-state marriage by their domiciliaries even when
those domiciliaries left their domicile to evade statutory prohibitions prevent-
ing their marriage in-state, or have they instead validated the marriage de-
spite the evasion statute?
In answering these questions, our research has found, although
with exceptions regularly occurring in states with marriage evasion
statutes, that courts do not use a public policy exception to refuse to
validate an out-of-state marriage even when the domicile has an explic-
it statutory prohibition against the marriage in question. Instead, courts
repeatedly indicate that they have the discretion to use such a public
policy exception but then validate the out-of-state marriage following
the general rule in favor of recognition. Although a few states use the
exception consistently, virtually all the rest recognize the existence of
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Cox, Choice of Law, supra note 12, at 1065.
31. This review was completed as of September 1, 1996. The states that were considered are
Alaska, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illi-
nois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexi-
co, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. I have not done this research myself but,
instead, am relying on the research that has been conducted by the people participating in the
Clearinghouse Project. It is possible that this research is incomplete, inaccurate, or inexact. But,
having read all the research from these states, I have concluded that it is accurate and complete
enough for purposes of drawing some conclusions from these materials.
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such an exception but rarely use it.
The question that will occur once Hawaii, or some other state,
permits marriage by same-sex couples is whether this rarely-used pub-
lic policy exception will come into play, just as it did for miscegenous
marriages. Only in those states with anti-miscegenation statutes can one
find consistent and repeated use of public policy exceptions to refuse to
recognize otherwise valid out-of-state marriages.32 Once the Supreme
Court outlawed such refusals as unconstitutional, the public policy
exception fell into disuse. Perhaps once again, courts will try to
bring out this exception, dust it off, and assert it as a legitimate reason
to refuse to recognize marriages by same-sex couples. Perhaps once
again, it will take a case like Romer v. Evans,3 to stop courts from
using a tool, in the name of public policy, that is simply a way to
unconstitutionally deny the fundamental right to marry 5 to yet another
segment of our population.'
Hl. HAVE COURTS ACTUALLY USED A PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION TO
REFUSE RECOGNITION OF OUT-OF-STATE MARRIAGES?
After reviewing the cases from the states for which research has
been completed, I feel confident in arguing that the vast majority of
courts have not used a public policy exception to invalidate their
domiciliaries' out-of-state marriages. That is not to say that the courts
do not repeatedly claim that they can use such a public policy excep-
tion to refuse to recognize those marriages that they believe violate the
domicile's public policy. The courts make this claim, believing that
using the public policy exception to invalidate the marriage is superior
32. Many of the courts which have refused recognition of interracial marriages are in states
for which we do not have research at this time. Rather than do a seriously incomplete analysis of
the interracial marriage cases, which varied significantly in result depending on location of the
state, I have excluded those cases from consideration in this article. While that clearly lessens the
thoroughness of this article, I refer the reader who is interested in analysis of those cases to the
excellent article by Professor Andrew Koppelman which is included in this symposium issue. See
Andrew Koppelman, Same-Sex Marriage and Public Policy: The Miscegenation Precedents, 16
QunmmAc L. REV. 105 (1997).
33. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
34. 116 S. CL 1620 (1996).
35. The right to marry is a part of the fundamental right to privacy implicit in the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause. Cox, Choice of Law, supra note 12, at 1054, citing Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) and Skinner ex rel. Williams v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). No
court has indicated that the fundamental right to marry extends to same-sex couples, including the
Hawaii Supreme Court in Baehr which explicitly rejected such an argument Baehr v. Lewin, 852
P.2d 44,52 (Haw. 1993).
36. See Cox, Anti-Gay Initiatives, supra note 12, for a discussion of the ways in which the
recent passage of statutes refusing recognition of marriages by same-sex couples may violate
Romer.
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to using the general choice of law rule that would validate the mar-
riage.
In short, 'public policy' is one way to avoid the application of a choice of
law rule which the forum wishes to avoid. The objection of the forum, thus,
is not to the content of the foreign law but to its own choice of law rule.
Rather than to change or modify the supposedly applicable rule the court
may refuse on public policy grounds to apply the law to which the rule
makes reference. The closer the tie between the forum and the facts of a
given transaction the more readily we may expect the forum to use its own
law to judge the matter before it. In such a view the 'public policy' doctrine
becomes a kind of choice of law principle, imprecise, uncertain of applica-
tion, but nevertheless discharging a choice of law function. It is a way of
saying, 'In these circumstances this forum makes reference to its internal law
rather than to the law of another state to which our 'normal' choice of law
rule would direct us.,"
Given the frequency with which courts refer to the public policy
exception, they clearly believe they are justified in rejecting their own
choice-of-law rules in order to refuse recognition of a validly contract-
ed marriage. But they have been quite reluctant to use the exception
and quite liberal in recognizing marriages celebrated in other states.38
Finding cases where the courts have actually used a public policy ex-
ception to refuse to recognize their domiciliaries' out-of-state marriages
was difficult. That is not to say that they do not exist; they do.
For example, in Pennegar v. State,39 the Tennessee Supreme
Court considered the marriage of a woman who was divorced on the
ground of adultery and who went to Alabama to marry the man with
whom she had committed adultery.' Such remarriage was prohibited
by Tennessee statute during the life of her first husband."' Explaining
the general rule in favor of recognition, the court noted that:
[mlarriage is an institution recognized and governed to a large degree by
international law, prevailing in all countries, and constituting an essential
37. Monrad G. Paulsen & Michael I. Sovem, "Public Policy" in the Conflict of Laws, 56
COLUM. L. REV. 969, 981 (1956).
38. Id. at 994 n.90. The authors compare cases in which the courts have recognized out-of-
state marriages (when remarriage was prohibited in the domicile, when interracial marriage was
prohibited in the domicile, and when incestuous marriage was prohibited in the domicile) against
those when they have refused recognition (when remarriage was prohibited in the domicile, when
interracial marriage was prohibited in the domicile, when incestuous marriage was prohibited in
the domicile.) Id.
39. 10 S.W. 305 (Tenn. 1889).
40. Id. at 305.
41. Id.
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element in all earthly society. The well-being of society ... demands that
one state or nation shall recognize the validity of marriage had in other states
or nations, according to the laws of the latter, unless some positive statute or
pronounced public policy of the particular state demands otherwise. '2
The court noted the two usual exceptions to the general rule-mar-
riages deemed contrary to the law of nature (which it defined as those
involving polygamy or incest) and marriages which the local law-mak-
ing power has declared invalid (either expressly or by implication).43
The court then went on to discuss, with more concern than many other
courts, what statutes embody "distinctive state policy, as affecting the
morals or good order of society."'
It is not always easy to determine what is a positive state policy. It will not
do to say that every provision of a statute prohibiting marriage, under certain
circumstances, or between certain parties, is indicative of a state policy in the
sense in which it is used in this connection. To so hold would be to overturn
this most solemn relation, involving legitimacy of offspring, homestead dow-
er, and the rights of property.... Each state or nation has ultimately to de-
termine for itself what statutory inhibitions are by it intended to be impera-
tive, as indicative of the decided policy of the state concerning the morals
and good order of society, to that degree which will render it proper to disre-
gard the jus gentium of 'valid where solemnized, valid everywhere."
The court explained the difference in results from state-to-state as
dependent on each court's interpretation of "the meaning, intent, and
scope of each particular statute on the subject of marriage in the light
of the known policy of the state .... ." When considering the prohi-
bition on remarriage by an adulterous spouse, the court concluded that
the statute was intended to protect the sensibilities of the innocent ex-
spouse and prevent an affront to the public decency because "the moral
sense of the community is shocked and outraged" by the adulterous
couple living together openly.' The court thus held the remarriage to
be invalid and let stand the conviction of lewdness.'
42. Id. at 306.
43. Pennegar, 10 S.W. at 306.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 308.
47. Pennegar, 10 S.W. at 308.
48. Id. See also, Rhodes v. McAfee, 457 S.W.2d 522, 523-24 (Tenn. 1970) (finding the Mis-
sissippi marriage of a stepfather and his stepdaughter, which would also be void in Mississippi,
invalid in Tennessee due to the "discord and disharmony" it would cause within the family).
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In Brinson v. Brinson,49 the Louisiana Supreme Court refused to
recognize a common-law marriage entered into in Mississippi.' Al-
though the court concluded that the parties had married in bad faith
because both knew that the man was still married to his first wife at
the time of the second marriage, it was uncertain whether Mississippi
law would recognize a common-law marriage under such circumstanc-
es.5 Assuming that the marriage would be valid in Mississippi, the
court considered whether it. was valid in Louisiana.52 The court stated
that "it would be contrary to the public policy of this state to hold that
a bigamous marriage contracted in bad faith in another state may nev-
ertheless produce its civil effects under our law."53 Stating that "[iut is
a well established rule of conflict of laws that the spirit of comity be-
tween states does not require a state to recognize a marriage which is
contrary to its own public policy[,]" '54 the court concluded that Louisi-
ana code and cases required "absolute good faith" on the part of a
spouse claiming civil effects from a bigamous marriage.55 Thus, it
held that "it would be inimical to public policy for this [c]ourt to con-
clude that such a relationship, conceived in bad faith, will be given
effect in Louisiana merely because it may be sanctioned in the state
wherein it existed. ' "s
New York reached a similar result in the recent case of People v.
49. 96 So. 2d 653 (La. 1957).
50. Id. at 659.
51. Id. at 658. Discussing Mississippi law, the Court referred to various cases that seemed to
require good faith by the parties to have their common-law marriage considered valid once the
impediment that marriage had been removed by the first wife's divorce if they had not entered
into a new agreement to marry following removal of the impediment. Id. at 658-59. But since the
Court recognized, given a mix of cases from Mississippi, that it might be interpreting Mississippi
law incorrectly, it turned to the question of whether such a marriage would be valid in Louisiana
assuming it was valid in Mississippi. Brinson, 96 So.2d at 658-59.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 659.
54. The Court cited 35 AM. JUR., Marriage, § 172 for the proposition:
Although the general rule is that the validity of a marriage contract is determined by
the lex loci contractus and celebrationis, it is not every marriage which may be valid
by such law that will be recognized as legal everywhere else. Every sovereign state is
the conservator of its own morals and the good order of its society. Consequently,
where marriages between certain persons are prohibited by the public policy and law of
one jurisdiction as contrary to the morals and social order, they will not be deemed
valid therein, although they are deemed valid in the state or place where they were
celebrated, and although the parties to the marriage were there domiciled ....
96 So. 2d at 659.
55. Id. at 659.
56. Id.
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Ezeonu.5" In this case, a Nigerian national was charged with second-
degree rape of a woman, whom he claimed was his "second" or "ju-
nior" wife." If the court found the Nigerian marriage between the
parties to be valid in New York, then it would constitute a factual
defense to the charge of rape." The court found that the defendant
was married to another woman under the laws of both Nigeria and
New York, and thus, even though the second marriage comported with
Nigerian custom, it was null and void in New York.' Although the
court recited the general rule that a marriage valid where celebrated
would also be valid in New York, it stated that "it is well established
that this general rule does not apply where recognition of a marriage is
repugnant to public policy."' Turning to New York Domestic Rela-
tions Law which declares a marriage to be "absolutely void" if con-
tracted by a person with a living wife by a former marriage,62 and
New York Penal Law which makes bigamy a crime in New York,63
the court concluded that the marriage was absolutely void in New York
and could not be asserted as a defense to the rape charge.' The court
noted that "it has been held that when this state is called upon to rec-
ognize either an incestuous or bigamous marriage, it will assert its
strong public policy of condemnation thereof and refuse recognition
even if that marriage was valid where consummated."
57. 588 N.Y.S.2d 116 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992).
58. New York Penal Law § 130.30 provided that "A person is guilty of Rape in the Second
Degree when, being eighteen years old or more, he or she engages in sexual intercourse with an-
other person to whom the actor is not married less than fourteen years old."
59. Ezeonu, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 117.
60. 588 N.Y.S.2d at 117.
61. Id. New York has refused to recognize marriages on other public policy grounds as well.
For example, see Holland v. Holland, 212 N.Y.S.2d 805 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1961) and Cunningham v.
Cunningham, 99 N.E. 845 (N.Y. 1912) where both courts refused to recognize marriages between
New York residents out-of-state when one of the parties was underage. In Holland, the court re-
ferred to exceptions from the general rule of validation "where the countervailing public policy of
the domicile of the contracting parties are affected, particularly where the rights and welfare of
infants are involved and where the contracting parties were domiciled at the time of the marriage
and where the State of the domicile is also the forum." 212 N.Y.S.2d at 806.
62. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 6 (Consl. Supp. 1996).
63. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 255.15 (Cons]. 1984).
64. Ezeonu, 588 N.Y.S. 2d at 117-18.
65. Id. at 117 (quoting Bronislawa K. v. Tadeusz K., 90 Misc. 2d 183, 393 N.Y.S.2d 534
(1977) (citing Matter of May's Estate, 305 N.Y. 486 (1953)). Interestingly, the court refers to
Matter of May's Estate as support for this proposition. That well-known case upheld the validity
of a Rhode Island marriage between an uncle and a niece who were Jewish, as permitted by their
religion and excepted from a Rhode Island prohibition of such marriages. Considering the mar-
riage between the parties, both New York residents, which lasted thirty-two years, the May court
held that "subject to two exceptions presently to be considered, and in the absence of a statute
expressly regulating within the domiciliary State marriages solemnized abroad, the legality of a
marriage between person sui juris is to be determined by the law of the place where it is celebrat-
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These examples establish that courts do, in fact, use a public poli-
cy exception to refuse to validate marriages which they believe fall
outside the general rule favoring recognition. But the cases are rare
enough to make one wonder what all the fuss about a public policy
exception is about. As discussed below, only in states with marriage
evasion statutes have courts regularly refused to validate marriages
prohibited under their own statutes when they believed their
domiciliaries left the state with the sole purpose of evading those stat-
utes. But even there, the courts have been far from consistent. The
most consistent refusal of recognition was for marriages out-of-state
that violated the domicile's anti-miscegenation statute and again, even
there, the cases are not consistent.' It is likely that courts will treat
marriages by same-sex couples similarly to the way they treated inter-
racial marriages; some states will recognize them, some states will not,
and uniformity will not be achieved until the Supreme Court recognizes
that same-sex couples have a fundamental right to marry.
The answer to the question posed above, after reviewing this re-
search (which, admittedly, is far from complete), is that states do not
regularly use a public policy exception to refuse recognition of out-of-
state marriages. In fact, what surprised me is that courts have not used
a public policy exception to refuse recognition even when their
domiciliaries would have been prohibited within the state from entering
into the marriage that they entered into out-of-state. It is not surprising
to find that courts recognize. marriages that would be valid in the domi-
cile even when entered into outside the domicile; that is, after all, what
the general rule on marriage recognition tells us. But I did not expect
to find that the courts, while espousing the right to use a public policy
exception, have not done so even when the marriage would violate the
domicile's own marriage statutes.-
Some of these cases are not surprising. When the parties violated
some form or license requirement or some other technicality was miss-
ed." Id. at 6. Because the New York statute prohibiting such marriages as incestuous did not have
extraterritorial effect and thus did not fit under the exception of cases within the prohibition of
positive law, the court then turned to whether it fell within the exception for "cases involving
polygamy or incest in a degree regarded generally as within the prohibition of natural law." lId
The court concluded that the marriage between persons of the Jewish faith who were not in the
"direct ascending or descending line or consanguinity and who were not brother and sister" was
not "offensive to the public sense of morality to a degree regarded generally with abhorrence and
thus was not within the inhibitions of natural law." Id at 7. This same refusal to use public policy
to deny recognition of other such marriages is discussed throughout the remainder of this paper.
66. See supra note 32.
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ing, one would hope the courts would not destroy the parties' justified
expectations and reek havoc with their personal relationships just to
affirm a statutory technicality. Some people may also discount cases
discussed below where courts validated out-of-state marriages that
violated underage restrictions. Many of us would agree that courts
should find those restrictions to be "directory" only.
But it is difficult to discount cases where the out-of-state marriage
violated the domicile's restrictions on first cousins or uncle/niece mar-
riage as incestuous, violated the domicile's restrictions on adultery or
when a divorced person could remarry, or violated the domicile's re-
strictions on interracial marriage and even polygamy.67 One might
expect to find that in these cases the courts would turn to a public
policy exception. They seem to fit within those limited occasions when
a court might be expected to use public policy.
The right of a court to declare what is or is not in accord with public policy
does not extend to specific economic and social problems which are contro-
versial in nature and capable of solution only as the result of a study of vari-
ous facts and conditions. It is only when a given policy is so obviously for or
against the public health, safety, morals or welfare that there is a virtual
unanimity of opinion with regard to it, that a court may constitute itself the
voice of the community in so declaring. There must be a positive, well de-
fined, universal public sentiment, deeply integrated in the customs and beliefs
of the people and in their conviction of what is just and right and in the
interests of the public weal .... If, in the domain of economic and social
controversies, a court were, under the guise of the application of public poli-
cy, in effect to enact provisions it might consider expedient and desirable,
such action would be nothing short of judicial legislation .... Only in the
clearest cases, therefore, may a court make an alleged public policy on the
basis of judicial decision."
But the courts have not used public policy in those situations.
Clearly, incest and adultery would seem to fit this description of when
courts would be expected to declare that the states' public policy would
forbid recognition of such marriages. But the courts have not reached
that result. Reading that description, we might expect that courts would
use it to refuse to validate marriages by same-sex couples. And they
may. But it seems difficult to distinguish incest and adultery as within
67. I do not want to overstate the case. The polygamy case referred to is from California
where the court recognized a polygamous marriage simply for inheritance purposes and specifi-
cally noted it would have refused to do so for cohabitation purposes. In re Dalip Singh Bir's Es-
tate, 188 P.2d 499 (Cal. 1948) (recognizing polygamous marriage from India so as to allow estate
claims by both wives).
68. Mamlin v. Genoe, 17 A.2d 407, 409 (Pa. 1941). Accord, In re Christoff Estate, 192 A.2d
737, 739 (Pa. 1963) (quoting Mamlin), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 965 (1964).
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the public policy of a state which has prohibited it and marriage by
same-sex couples as outside the public policy of a state especially
when the state has not prohibited it.'
Perhaps they are mindful of the words of Judge Beach in their
hesitance:
It would be an intolerable affectation of superior virtue for the courts of one
state to pretend that the mere enforcement of a right validly created by the
laws of a sister state 'would be repugnant to good morals, would lead to
disturbance and disorganization of the local municipal law,' or would be of
such evil example as to corrupt the jury or the public."
Similarly, another commentator noted: "As among our states, the sight
of the courts of one state refusing to apply the law of another because
the second state's rule shocks the morals of the forum, is one to make
the judicious grieve."'
In these situations, the majority of cases that I have found have
validated the marriage. They did not have to do so; they had the public
policy exception at hand to support a refusal of recognition. But they
did recognize the out-of-state marriage. If anything consistent can be
found from this research, it is that they did recognize those marriages.
Apparently, up until this time, courts from around the country have
found that virtually no marriage violates public policy, including those
that violate the domiciliary state's own marriage statutes. A review of
those cases leads to this inescapable conclusion.
A. Arkansas
Arkansas has used two different choice-of-law theories in uphold-
ing out-of-state marriage by its domiciliaries. In State v. Graves,' the
supreme court used the First Restatement to determine that a marriage
between underage domiciliaries of Arkansas, which was entered into in
Mississippi, where such a marriage was valid with the parents' consent,
was valid in Arkansas. Graves is an interesting opinion because, after
citing the general rule of validation, the court refers to the section 132
exceptions, 3 which include "(4) marriage of a domiciliary which the
69. See supra note 12, indicating that only twelve states explicitly prohibit marriages by
same-sex couples.
70. John K. Beach, Uniform Interstate Enforcement of Vested Rights, 27 YALE LJ. 656, 662
(1918).
71. Herbert F. Goodrich, Foreign Facts and Local Fancies, 25 VA. L. REv. 26, 35 (1938).
72. 307 S.W.2d 545 (Ark. 1957).
73. Id. at 547.
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statute at the domicile makes void even though celebrated in another
state. '74 The court cited numerous other out-of-state cases, including
In re Perez' Estate,7 which stated:
Was the Arizona marriage of respondent and decedent void because it was
contracted between the parties for the specific purpose and with the specific
intent of evading the laws of California? This question must be answered in
the negative. If parties who are residents of and domiciled in California,
where their marriage would have been invalid, are married in another state in
conformity with the laws of such state, even though they have entered such
state with the avowed purpose of evading the laws of the state of California,
such motive does not invalidate the marriage.76
After reviewing previous Arkansas cases in which there was a conflict
on whether underage marriages are void ab initio, the court concluded:
For a period of more than a century, the established law, as well as the pub-
lic policy of the State, was that underage marriages were valid until they
were nullified by a court of competent jurisdiction .... In the circumstances,
it can hardly be said that the public policy of this State against under-age
marriages is so strong that such a marriage, valid in the state where it was
contracted, is void in this state .... We have no statute which provides that
marriages such as the one involved here, celebrated in another state, are void
in the State of Arkansas.'
The court reached this conclusion despite the fact that Arkansas Stat-
utes section 55-102 specifically states that a marriage by persons under
age fourteen shall be void and despite the fact that another statute ex-
plicitly indicated that Arkansas courts could find such marriages to be
void.7'
In another Arkansas case," the court used Leflar's choice-influ-
encing considerations to uphold as valid an out-of-state marriage that
violated Arkansas' incest statute because it was a marriage between
first cousins.'s The court, in explaining its decision to validate the
74. FIRsT RESATEMENT § 132(d).
75. 219 P.2d 35 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1950).
76. Id. at 36 (citing McDonald v. McDonald, 6 Cal. 2d 457, 459, 58 P.2d 163, 165 (1936)).
77. Graves, 307 S.W.2d at 550.
78. Id. at 459. The court does cite ARK. STAT. § 55-106 which provides: "When either of the
parties to a marriage shall be incapable, from want of age or understanding, of [contracting] to any
marriage ... the marriage shall be void, from the time its nullity shall be declared by a court of
competent jurisdiction." Graves, 307 S.W.2d at 549. While this statute implies that the marriage in
this case, thus, was not void yet, the court could have, presumably, used that statute and the pub-
lic policy it embodied to find the marriage void despite being valid in Mississippi. Id.
79. Etheridge v. Shaddock, 706 S.W.2d 395 (Ark. 1986).
80. Id. at 395-96. The parties were married in Arkansas without realizing that their marriage,
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marriage despite the Arkansas incest statute which prohibited it, stated:
We have no doubt that the Arkansas policy against incest is so strong that we
would not recognize the validity of a marriage, even if performed in another
state, between very close blood relatives, such as a father and daughter or a
brother and sister. The majority view, however, in states forbidding a mar-
riage between first cousins, is that such a marriage does not create 'much
social alarm,' so that the marriage will be recognized if it was valid by the
law of the state in which it took place."
Citing State v. Graves,82 the court said the "heart" of that opinion stat-
ed that:
The celebration of a marriage gives rise to many ramifications, including
questions of legitimacy, inheritance, property rights, dower and homestead,
and causes of action growing out of the marital status. We have no statute
which provides that marriages such as the one involved here, celebrated in
another state, are void in the State of Arkansas."
The court saw "no reason to elaborate upon a line of reasoning that is
still good."" So rather than using public policy to invalidate an out-
of-state marriage, even though it would be invalid in-state, the courts
used public policy to affirm the general rule.
B. California
For over 120 years, California courts have repeatedly recognized
that the expressed, long-term and unquestioned public policy of Cali-
fornia has been to respect validly contracted marriages.' Even when
as first cousins, was prohibited by ARK. STAT. ANN. § 55-103 (repealed 1971). Etheridge, 706
S.W.2d at 396. A year later, the parties were informed that their marriage was invalid under Ar-
kansas law and went to Texas for the sole purpose of remarrying there, since Texas law did not
prohibit the marriage. Id.
81. Etheridge, 706 S.W.2d at 396 (citing LEFLAR, AMERIcAN CONFuCTs LAw § 221 (3d ed.
1977)).
82. 307 S.W. 2d 545 (Ark. 1957).
83. Etheridge, 706 S.W.2d at 396 (citing Graves, 307 S.W.2d at 550).
84. Etheridge, 706 S.W.2d at 396.
85. Tatum v. Tatum, 241 F.2d 401 (9th Cir. 1957) (recognizing common law marriage from
out of state); Barrons v. United States, 191 F.2d 92 (9th Cir. 1951) (recognizing proxy marriage
from Nevada, although California did not recognize proxy marriages); In re Dalip Sing Bit's Es-
tate, 188 P.2d 499 (Cal. Dist. CL App. 1948) (recognizing polygamous marriage from India so as
to allow estate claims by both wives); Colbert v. Colbert, 169 P.2d 633 (Cal. 1946 ) (recognizing
in California a common law marriage which was validly contracted in a sister state); McDonald v.
McDonald, 58 P.2d 163 (Cal. 1936) (recognizing Nevada marriage contacted within four and a
half months of one spouse's divorce, in violation of California's one year waiting period before a
divorcee could remarry); Pearson v. Pearson, 51 Cal. 120 (1875) (recognizing interracial marriage
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those marriages violated current California laws, such as those prohib-
iting interracial marriage, prohibiting remarriage after divorce within
one year, and prohibiting underage marriage, the state's overriding pol-
icy of protecting validly contracted marriages held sway.'
In Norman v. Norman," the court considered whether a marriage
between a man and an underage woman was valid when it was solem-
nized while the parties were at sea off the coast of California. Explain-
ing the rules in question, the court stated:
If the marriage in question can find support by the laws of any country hav-
ing jurisdiction of the parties at the place where the marriage ceremony was
performed, we should feel constrained by our code rule and well-considered
decisions to declare it valid here, even though the parties were here domi-
ciled at the time and went to the place where they attempted to be married
for the purpose of evading our laws which they believed forbade the
banns.u
The court, however, found that the parties, by going onto the high seas,
went where no written law existed for solemnizing the marriage, and
therefore it was invalid."
When considering an interracial marriage which would not have
been valid if entered into in California due to its anti-miscegenation
statute, the court nevertheless recognized the marriage of a white man
and black woman entered into in Utah.' The court found that there
was no law in Utah at the time of the marriage prohibiting interracial
marriage and therefore a lawful marriage had been contracted.9 Using
California's validation statute, the court determined that out of state
marriages that were valid where contracted were valid within Califor-
nia, except for those that were polygamous or incestuous.' Another
case affirmed the marriage of California domiciliaries in Nevada even
though they were under the age of consent at the time of the mar-
riage.' Although noting that the marriage, if it had occurred in Cali-
fornia, would be subject to annulment for failure of the parties to pro-
despite California laws nullifying them).
86. McDonald, 58 P.2d at 163; Estate of Wood, 69 P. at 900; Pearson, 51 Cal. at 120.
87. 54 P. 143 (Cal. 1898).
88. Id. at 144.
89. Id. at 146.
90. Pearson, 51 Cal. 120 (1875).
91. ld at 124.
92. Id. at 125.
93. McDonald v. McDonald, 58 P.2d 163 (Cal. 1936).
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cure parental consent," the marriage was valid in Nevada." Again
citing the validation statute,"' the court held:
Even though the parties here, residents of and domiciled in California, went
to the state of Nevada to be married, and with the avowed purpose of evad-
ing our laws relating to marriages, such a motive, if in the minds of the
parties, would not change the operation of the well-settled rule that a mar-
riage which is contrary to the policies of the laws of one state is yet valid
therein if celebrated within and according to the laws of another state....
Each state may follow its citizens into another state and regulate the status of
its own citizens, especially such a status as the marriage relation .... The
Legislature of California has not enacted a statute that such marriages shall
have no validity here. In the absence of such a statute of the domicile of the
parties, expressly and clearly regulating marriages abroad, the lex loci con-
tractus governs as to the validity of the marriage. An exception, of course,
arises when the marriage is regarded as odious by common consent of na-
tions: e.g., where it is polygamous or incestuous by the laws of nature.'
The court refused to permit the annulment of the marriage because it
would not only repudiate the entire concept of marriage (to invalidate a
valid marriage), but it "would also indirectly repudiate the doctrine of
Conflict of Laws, universally recognized and embodied in section 63 of
the Civil Code." 8
The court reached the same result when recognizing common law
marriages entered into outside of California even though California did
not recognize them,"9 and recognizing a proxy marriage entered into
in Nevada although California did not recognize them." In a case
frequently cited, In re Estate of Dalip Singh Bir, °' the court permit-
ted two wives of the deceased to share equally in the proceeds of his
estate, each being hs lawful wife from marriages entered into in India
94. Id. at 163 (referring to CAL. Civ. CODE § 82(1) (1874)).
95. Id.
96. "Cal. Civ. Code § 63 provides: 'All marriages contracted without the state, which would
be valid by the laws of the country in which the same were contracted, are valid in this state."' Id.
at 164.
97. McDonald, 58 P.2d at 164 (citations omitted).
98. l. at 165. The court continued: "Under appellant's reasoning, by recognizing the validity
of the foreign law until the subject reaches our borders, and then denying the validity previously
recognized, we would effectually eliminate from our jurisprudence the entire field of Conflict of
Law." Id.
99. Tatum v. Tatum, 241 F.2d 401 (9th Cir. 1957) (recognizing common law marriages
created in states that allow them but holding that plaintiff did not meet the burden of proving
formation of an agreement); Colbert v. Colbert, 169 P.2d 633 (Cal. 1946).
100. Barrons v. United States, 191 F.2d 92 (9th. Cir. 1951).
101. 188 P.2d 499 (Cal. 1948).
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where polygamous marriages are permitted. 2 The court reviewed nu-
merous early decisions and several commentators' views before noting
that "it is not correct to say that English law can in no case recognize
polygamous marriages as valid, or the issue thereof as legitimate."' 3
It then concluded that the trial court's decision, to allow inheritance
only by the first wife, was influenced by the rule of "public poli-
cy."'" The court determined, however, that public policy would "ap-
ply only if the decedent had attempted to cohabit with his two wives in
California. Where only the question of descent of property is involved,
'public policy' is not affected."105 "'Public policy' would not be af-
fected by dividing the money equally between the two wives, particu-
larly since there is no contest between them and they are the only inter-
ested parties."'"6
In most other states, this has also been what we found when doing
the research. Like California, the other state courts claim that the public
policy exception permits them to refuse to recognize out-of-state mar-
riages by state domiciiaries that were valid where entered but not valid
in their home state. But they repeatedly validate these marriages, de-
spite this claimed ability to refuse to do so via the public policy excep-
tion.
C. Connecticut
Connecticut has neither a marriage validation statute nor an eva-
sion statute. On two occasions, it did use public policy to refuse to
recognize a marriage entered into outside Connecticut. In one case, the
Connecticut Supreme Court considered a marriage between an uncle
and a niece which was validly performed in Italy because the couple
had received a dispensation."°7 The court invalidated the marriage,
nonetheless, stating that the criminal incest statute expressed a strong
public policy against recognition."l6 The court focused on the fact that
this incestuous relationship had been criminally prohibited in the state
since 1702, and the stiff penalty of up to ten years in prison clearly
reflected the strong public policy of the state." 9 The court stated that
"a state has the authority to declare what marriages of its citizens shall
102. Id. at 502.
103. Id. at 501 (internal quotations omitted) (citing WE. Beckett, Recognition of Polygamous
Marriages Under English Law, 48 LAW REV. Q. 341, 351 (1932)).
104. Id. at 502.
105. In re Estate of Dalip Singh Bir, 188 P.2d at 502.
106. Id.
107. Catalano v. Catalano, 148 Conn. 288, 170 A.2d 726 (1961).
108. Id. at 290, 170 A.2d at 728.
109. Id. at 291, 170 A.2d at 728.
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be recognized as valid, regardless of the fact that the marriages may
have been entered into in foreign jurisdictions where they were val-
id."'1 ° This result was particularly harsh because the couple had a
child together, and she was denied any right to inheritance."' It is
somewhat less surprising, however, because it was a foreign marriage,
not one from a sister state.
In the only other case to use public policy grounds to invalidate a
marriage, the court considered the marriage of two nineteen year-olds
who crossed the New York state line and married on a dare from their
friends." 2 They never lived together."' Although the court turned to
New York law, nothing in its law would permit the marriage to be
voided for lack of intent to marry." 4 The court said that intent to
marry was so basic that the marriage was void without it."' Since
nothing in New York law led it to that conclusion, it turned to univer-
sally accepted notions of what a marriage entails to invalidate the mar-
riage for lack of intent to marry."6
In a later case explaining its understanding of public policy, the
court, while upholding a common law marriage contracted in Rhode
Island, stated that a marriage will be invalid only where it is "against
the strong [public] policy of this state so as to shock the con-
science.""' 7 A commentator has indicated that marriages that are
against public policy are ones which are clearly against the public
interest, such as those involving incest, bigamy, or an underage individ-
ual."" However, in Anderson v. Anderson,"' the court held that the
issue of whether a marriage is bigamous, and therefore void, must be
determined by the law of the state where the marriage took place.'O
Thus, it seems that the court was unwilling to use the public policy of
Connecticut to invalidate that marriage.
110. Id.
111. Catalano, 148 Conn. at 289, 170 A.2d at 727.
112. Davis v. Davis, 119 Conn. 194, 175 A. 574 (1934).
113. Id. at 196, 175 A. at 575.
114. Id. at 201, 175 A. at 576.
115. Id. at 203, 175 A. at 577.
116. Davis, 119 Conn. at 203, 175 A. at 577. After this decision, numerous cases arose where
individuals attempted to invalidate their marriages due to lack of consent. The Supreme Court
retreated from the holding in Davis and in no other cases has a marriage been invalidated for lack
of consent. See Harriet S. Daggett, Annulment of Marriage in Connecticut, 25 CONN. BJ. 1
(1951).
117. Delaney v. Delaney, 34 Conn. Supp. 230, 231, 405' A.2d 91, 92 (1979).
118. C.E.P. Davis, Annulment of Marriage, 27 CoNN. BJ. 41, 63 (1953).
119. 27 Conn. Supp. 342, 238 A.2d 45 (Conn. 1967).
120. Id. at 46.
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D. Illinois
Illinois is an interesting example. As noted below, the Illinois
courts are quick to invalidate marriages that violate Illinois' statutory
prohibitions when the court believes that Illinois' domiciliaries went to
another state to avoid Illinois' statutes. But the court has used Illinois'
validation statute to uphold otherwise valid out-of-state marriages. In In
re Estate of Banks,' the court had to determine whether a decedent's
Arkansas marriage in July 1991 was valid or whether it was precluded
by his first marriage which was not dissolved until September
1991.' 22 The first wife asserted that the second wife was not entitled
to the estate because she was never legally married to the decedent.'2
The first wife argued that Illinois law did not control because the mar-
riage was contracted under Arkansas law, and that the marriage would
have been void under Arkansas law." The court determined that un-
der the validation statute, "out-of-State marriages are recognized as
valid thereby giving full faith and credit to a sister State's laws, if they
were valid when contracted."'" The court concluded the decedent's
marriage to his second wife was invalid under Arkansas law, because
Arkansas does not recognize bigamous marriages and Arkansas had no
legislation validating such marriages subsequent to the decedent's sec-
ond marriage." However, the court did validate the marriage, be-
cause as residents of Illinois, the decedent and his second wife were
subject to the law of Illinois, which automatically validated their mar-
riage after the first marriage was dissolved."z The first wife contend-
ed that the statute only applied to marriages contracted in Illinois. The
court refused to so limit the section and stated that to do so would not
serve the purpose of the Illinois validation statute, which is "to
strengthen and preserve the integrity of marriage and safeguard family
relationships."'"
121. 629 N.E.2d 1223 (111. 1994).
122. Id. at 1224.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. In re Estate of Banks, 629 N.E.2d at 1225.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1226. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/212(b) (West 1992) states that prohibited bigamous
marriages become valid marriages at the time the impediment to the marriage is removed. Use of
this statute to validate the marriage is consistent with the validation statute because the statute
specifies that all marriages contracted outside of Illinois that were subsequently validated by the
domicile of the parties are valid in Illinois. § 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/213 (West 1992).
128. In re Estate of Banks, 629 N.E.2d at 1223, 1225 (11. 1994).
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The Illinois courts have also refused to allow statutory prohibi-
tions to be used to invalidate marriages when it finds those prohibitions
to be "directory" only, not making the marriage a nullity. For example,
in Reifschniider v. Reifschneider,' 9 two minors went to Indiana
where they contracted a marriage, returned to Illinois, and kept the
marriage a secret for three years.' 3 When one of the parties filed for
maintenance, the other claimed that the Indiana marriage violated Indi-
ana law because they had lied about their age and had not obtained
parental consent as required by Indiana law.' Using section 7295 of
the Indiana Revised Statutes which states that no marriage is void or
voidable for want of a license or other formal requirement if both
parties thought they were married, the Illinois court refused to invali-
date the marriage. It noted that "the general rule is that, unless a statute
expressly declares a marriage contracted without the necessary consent
of the parents, or other requirements of the statute, to be a nullity, such
statutes will be construed to be directory, only, in this respect, so that
the marriage will be held valid .... ,
E. Iowa
In Iowa, the courts have also affirmed marriages using the general
rule and not imposing a public policy exception. In Boehm v. Rohlfs,
two Wisconsin residents, aged nineteen and fourteen, were unable to
obtain a Wisconsin marriage license and, therefore, went to Minnesota
to marry. 33 They returned to Wisconsin immediately. In a dispute
over the nineteen-year-old's uncle's will, the question was whether he
had reached "majority by marriage" as required by the will.'3 The
Supreme Court of Iowa held that because the marriage was solemnized
in Minnesota, its validity would be determined under Minnesota
law. 13 The court concluded that because the marriage was valid in
Minnesota it was valid everywhere; it opined that finding a marriage
between two young people void when either could have asked to have
it annulled was harsh and unwarranted."3 The only other Iowa case
involving marriage recognition concerned whether it would recognize a
129. 89 N.E. 255 (111. 1909).
130. Id. at 256.
131. Id. Section 7292 of the Revised Statutes of Indiana required parental consent.
132. Id. at 257. See also Walker v. Walker, 44 N.E.2d 937 (11. App. Ct. 1942) (same result in
an underage marriage without parental consent by Illinois residents in Missouri).
133. 276 N.W. 105 (Iowa 1937).
134. Id. at 107.
135. Id at 108.
136. Id.
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common law marriage supposedly entered into in California. In In re
Marriage of Reed, the court held that, using either the Second Restate-
ment's significant contacts approach or the First Restatement's tradi-
tional rule, the marriage was not valid.137 The court found that Cali-
fornia did not recognize common law marriages entered into within its
borders and that no public policy favored common law marriages in
Iowa, thus, neither state had reason to recognize the marriage.
38
F. Kentucky
Kentucky courts have indicated that out-of-state marriages that
violate Kentucky public policy will not be recognized. The court re-
ferred to Kentucky statutes which declare that incestuous marriages,
bigamous marriages, marriages with someone incapable of contracting
a marriage, and underage marriages are void. 139 However, when faced
with the case of a girl from Kentucky who married at thirteen in Mis-
sissippi (which permits marriages by girls above the age of twelve), the
court held that the marriage was voidable but not void."4 The court
gave no reason for its conclusion that incestuous and bigamous mar-
riages are void but underage marriages were only voidable, except that
it was the intent of the legislature since underage marriages are not
contrary to public policy. 4' The court was not clear, however, on
how such public policy was determined.
In 1952, the Kentucky Supreme Court noted that no previous case
had reached it in which exceptions to the general rule had been al-
lowed.42 When explaining the purpose behind the general rule recog-
nizing marriages if valid where celebrated, the court stated that:
The sanctity of the home and every just and enlightened sentiment require
uniformity in the recognition of the marital status. The necessity that persons
legally married according to the laws of one jurisdiction shall not be consid-
ered as living in adultery in another, and that children begotten in lawful
wedlock in one place shall not be regarded as illegitimate in another, has
given rise to the general principle of international and interstate law that the
validity of a marriage is to be determined by reference to the law of the
place where it was celebrated. 43
137. 226 N.W.2d 795, 796 (Iowa 1975).
138. l&
139. Mangrum v. Mangrum, 220 S.W.2d 406, 406-07 (Ky. 1949).
140. l at 407.
141. Id. at 407-08.
142. Beddow v. Beddow, 257 S.W.2d 45, 47 (Ky. 1952).
143. Id.
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The court held that the state's public policy was violated by an
out-of-state marriage by a person who had been adjudged by the courts
to be insane and refused to recognize the marriage.' While finding
that many persons unable to "exercise clear reason, discernment and
sound judgment" entered into valid marriages, the court found "the
thought of marriage by one who is devoid of reason, or whose mind is
so beclouded by insanity as to be incapable of understanding the nature
of such a contract, is abhorrent."'4 Kentucky courts have also refused
to recognize common-law marriages when Kentucky domiciliaries
visited Ohio for a day or a week stating that "it takes more than riding
across the Ohio River to make one legal."'" It may be that these cas-
es will be used to oppose a Hawaiian marriage by Kentucky
domiciliaries who visit Hawaii for a short period of time. Such a mar-
riage in Hawaii, however, would be distinguishable because it would be
celebrated in the state and not made subject to a claim of common-law
status.
G. Maryland
Maryland claims to have a public policy exception to recognizing
out-of-state marriages, but its cases show a different result. Bigamy and
polygamy are crimes in Maryland. 47 For example, in Roth v.
Roth," the court held that such marriages are void ab initio when
contracted in another state. 49 The court determined, however, that the
marriage in that case, entered into in Virginia, would have been invalid
in both states.'" Maryland, however, did recognize the validity of a
technically bigamous marriage that was valid under California law
where the second marriage took place.' Maryland applied a Califor-
144. Id. at 48.
145. Id.
146. Vaughn v. Hufnagel, 473 S.W.2d 124, 124 (Ky. 1971); see also Kennedy v. Damron,
268 S.W.2d 22, 22 (Ky. 1954). But see Brown Adm'r v. Brown, 215 S.W.2d 971, 975 (Ky. 1948)
where the court did validate an out-of-state common-law marriage where the parties had actually
lived together during the winters of 1942 and 1945 in Florida, which would have been sufficient
to establish a common-law marriage in that state.
147. MD. ANN. CODE Art. 27, § 18 (1993).
148. 433 A.2d 1162 (Md. CL Spec. App. 1981).
149. Id. at 1164.
150. Id.
151. Bannister v. Bannister, 29 A.2d 287, 288 (Md. 1942). Mrs. Bannister had received an
interlocutory divorce decree before marrying Mr. Bannister, but her previous divorce was not final
until two months after the second marriage. The question was whether a California statute passed
after the date of the second marriage applied retroactively to four and one half years before the
marriage.
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nia statute retroactively thus validating the marriage in Maryland, be-
cause "marriages are valid everywhere if the requirements of the mar-
riage laws of the state where the contract of marriage takes place are
complied with."''
In explaining the reason for its decision in Bannister, the court
stated:
The reason for this rule is that it is desirable that there should be uniformity
in the recognition of the marital status, so that persons legally married ac-
cording to the laws of one state will not be held to be living in adultery in
one state, and that children begotten in lawful wedlock in one state will not
be held illegitimate in another."'
The court went on to note that the state has the sovereign power to
regulate marriages, and the effect it chose to give to marriages contract-
ed in other states is merely because of comity, or because public policy
and justice demand the recognition of such laws.' "[H]owever, the
State is not bound to give effect to marriage laws that are repugnant to
its own laws and policy. Marriages that are tolerated in another state
but are condemned by the State of Maryland as contrary to public
policy will not be held valid in this State."'55 The only example of
such a case that the court cited was Jackson v. Jacksonss where the
court refused to recognize an interracial marriage entered into outside
of Maryland in violation of Maryland law. 57
Despite that claim, Maryland upheld the validity of a marriage
between a Jewish man and his niece even though it violated the Mary-
land statute prohibiting marriages within certain degrees of consanguin-
ity and affinity 58 The Court of Appeals found that the couple mar-
ried in Rhode Island to avoid Maryland's law.'59 But it upheld the
marriage by finding it merely voidable, not void."6 "[T]he provision
contained in the statute of this state prohibiting the marriages of uncles
and nieces does not, we think, fall within any of the enumerated excep-
152. Id. at 289. Maryland applied the California statute retroactively because the statute did
not clearly express that it was not retroactive. Id.
153. Henderson v. Henderson, 87 A.2d 403, 409 (Md. 1952).
154. Id. at 408.
155. Id.
156. 33 A. 317 (Md. 1895).
157. Id. at 319. "The statutes of Maryland peremptorily forbid the marriage of a white person
and a negro and declare all such marriages forever void. It is, therefore, the declared policy of this
state to prohibit such marriages." Id. For a discussion of how courts have treated interracial mar-
riages in violation of anti-miscegenation statutes, see Koppelman, supra note 32.
158. Fensterwald v. Burk, 98 A. 358, 360 (Md. 1916), error dismissed, 248 U.S. 592 (1916).
159. Id. at 359.
160. Id. at 358.
[Vol. 16:61
tions to the general rule (that a marriage valid where performed is valid
everywhere). It is not incestuous according to the generally accepted
opinion of Christendom"' 6' and will not affect the morals or good or-
der of society. Maryland's courts have also found that statutory re-
quirements for solemnization of marriage are merely related to "form
and ceremony" so that common-law marriages are not repugnant to
Maryland's laws and policy, 63 although a later decision expressly de-
clared that "it is firmly settled that Maryland does not permit common
law marriages to be formed within its borders."'" Thus, Maryland
will recognize common law marriages entered into out-of-state despite
those marriages violating clearly established Maryland policy. So too
does Maryland recognize out-of-state marriages by its domiciliaries
who are underage," despite the fact that such marriages are severely
curtailed in Maryland by state statute."s The court found the statutory
requirements regarding age and parental consent were directory, not
mandatory; therefore, they "do not go to the essential validity of a mar-
riage."'67 Just how Maryland would interpret its public policy excep-
tion is unclear, thus, even though it statutorily prohibits marriages by
same-sex couples, it has not used the public policy exception to refuse
recognition of other out-of-state marriages that also violate state statu-
tory provisions."
161. Id. at 358.
162. Fensterwald, 98 A. at 358. See also, Harrison v. State, 22 Md. 468 (1864) (marriage
between uncle and niece, which predated statute declared void was made valid by retroactive
application of statute); John S. Strahom, Jr., Void and Voidable Marriages in Maryland And Their
Annulment, 2 MD. L. REV. 211 (1938).
163. Henderson v. Henderson, 87 A.2d 403, 409 (Md. 1952). See also Laccetti v. Laccetti,
225 A.2d 266, 268 (Md. 1967) (valid D.C. common-law marriage valid in Maryland); Jennings v.
Jennings, 315 A.2d 816, 823-24 (Md. CL Spec. App. 1974) (valid D.C. common-law marriage
valid in Maryland); and Blaw-Knox Construction Equipment Co. v. Morris, 596 A.2d 679, 686
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991).
164. Mendelson v. Mendelson, 541 A.2d 1331, 1339 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988).
165. Picarella v. Picarella, 316 A.2d 826, 847 (Md. CL Spec. App. 1974) (upholding marriage
of sixteen year old who committed fraud by lying about his age).
166. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 2-301 (1991).
167. Picarella, 316 A.2d at 835.
168. MD. CODE ANN., FAm. LAw § 2-201 (1996) implicitly requires a couple to be hetero-
sexual to be married in Maryland: the statute states that "only a marriage between a man and a
woman is valid in this state." Id. For a discussion of how the courts have used the public policy
exception in Maryland in conflicts cases, see Richard Bourne, Modern Maryland Conflicts: Back-
ing into the Twentieth Century One Hauch at a Time, 23 U. BALT. L. REV. 71, 93-104 (1993).
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H. Nebraska
Nebraska recognizes the out-of-state marriages of its domiciliaries
even when those marriages would have been invalid if entered into
within the state. In State v. Hand,'9 the Nebraska Supreme Court
considered the marriage of two Nebraska residents who were prohibited
from marrying under Nebraska law.Y° The court found that the defen-
dants went to Iowa for the express purpose of evading that law and
were married.' Since that marriage would have been valid in Iowa,
the court determined that "in the absence of express words, a legis-
lative intent to contravene the jus gentium under which the question of
the validity of a marriage contract is referred to the lex loci contractus
cannot be inferred. The intent must be clear and unmistakable expres-
sion."'" Finding that the marriage must be affirmed even though
done intentionally to evade state law, the court reasoned "[t]o hold
otherwise would be to render void numberless marriages and to make
illegitimate thousands of children the country over."'' Citing Nebras-
ka's marriage validation statute, the court concluded that the marriage
was valid. 74
The court reached the same conclusion in Staley v. State,"
where the husband was charged with bigamy and he defended on the
grounds that his first marriage was invalid because he and his first wife
were first cousins.' 6 That marriage was held in Iowa where it would
have been valid, although it would have been invalid in Nebraska."r
Citing Hand, the court concluded that since it was valid in Iowa, it was
also valid in Nebraska.' The court reached a different result when
considering whether a common-law marriage had been entered into by
the parties during a few visits in Colorado.'" Although Colorado did
recognize common-law marriages, Nebraska did not and the court con-
cluded that no marriage existed between the parties."
169. 126 N.W. 1002 (Neb. 1910).
170. Id. at 1002.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1003.
173. Hand, 126 N.W. at 1003.
174. Id.
175. 131 N.W. 1028 (Neb. 1911).
176. Id. at 1029.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. In re Binger's Estate, 63 N.W.2d 784 (Neb. 1954).
180. Id. at 791.
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I. Oregon
Oregon has case law that, while announcing the right to invalidate
out-of-state marriages due to the public policy exception, has not done
so and, in fact, has used public policy as the basis for validating the
marriages, despite violation of Oregon statutes. The clearest case is that
of Sturgis v. Sturgis,' in which a ward who had been adjudged a
spendthrift and had a guardian appointed, wanted to marry."s The
guardian refused to give permission which was required under Oregon
law."" The parties went to Washington and married there."s When
the couple returned to Oregon to live, the guardian challenged the mar-
riage. 1
The court, citing a Rhode Island case on similar facts, held:
[Ilt requires no argument to show that, even if the marriage might have been
void if solemnized in this state, it is nevertheless not such a union that it can
in any sense be considered so subversive of good morals, or so threatening to
the fabric of society, as to fall within the exception to the general rule re-
garding foreign marriages." .
The court noted the two general exceptions that are frequently cited:
"marriages which are deemed contrary to the law of nature as generally
recognized in Christian countries, such as involve polygamy and incest,
and marriages which the local lawmaking power has declared shall not
be allowed any validity, either in express terms or by necessary impli-
cation ... ."" The court also discussed a distinction Oregon had rec-
ognized between
marriage of divorced parties declared by law incapable of marrying and mar-
riage in violation .of some statutory prohibition penal in its nature. In the one
case the marriage is absolutely void, and in the other it is often held to be
valid, although the party may be punished criminally for violating the prohib-
itory statute."'
181. 93 P. 696 (Or. 1908).
182. Id.
183. Id. at 697.
184. Id.
185. Sturgis, 93 P. at 697.
186. Id. at 699 (citing Ex parte Chace, 58 A. 979 (R.I. 1904)).
187. Id. at 698.
188. Id. at 698-99. The court was referring to McLennan v. McLennan, 50 P. 802 (Or. 1897),
where the parties had divorced in Oregon and then gone out-of-state to remarry before the waiting
period in Oregon had expired. Sturgis, 93 P. at 698-99. The court found such remarriage invalid,
because technically one of the parties to the new marriage was not yet divorced under Oregon
law. McLennan, 50 P. at 803.
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Oregon also specifically used public policy to refuse to use the
law of the place of the parties' previous domicile in order to validate
an out-of-state marriage. In Garrett v. Chapman,89 a woman, who di-
vorced her husband in Montana on February 16th, married her second
husband in Idaho en route to Oregon on March 6th.' The question
before the Oregon court was whether the second marriage was valid in
Montana. 9' While noting that the general rule was that a marriage
valid in the state where it was performed will be valid in Oregon, the
court held that "[t]here may be exception to the general rule where the
policy of this state dictates a different result than would be reached by
the state where the marriage was performed."'" The court held that
when the domiciliary state (Montana) is not the state in which the par-
ties intend to reside, the marriage should be recognized if it is valid by
the laws of the state where it was consummated."
J. Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania's description and use of its public policy exception
makes it questionable whether its courts would feel justified in assert-
ing such an exception to invalidate an out-of-state marriage by a same-
sex couple that was otherwise valid. There are two older cases that use
the public policy exception to refuse to recognize the marriages of
Pennsylvania domiciliaries who leave the state, marry out-of-state to
evade its laws, and then return to Pennsylvania to live.'9' In both cas-
es, the statute that the parties were trying to evade was the one prohib-
iting the remarriage of an adulterous partner during the lifetime of the
previous spouse. 95 In both cases, while recognizing that the general
rule is that a marriage valid where celebrated is valid everywhere, the
courts noted exceptions where the marriage is contrary to the good
morals, public policy, or positive law of the state.' The Stull court
concluded that this marriage was against good morals, violated public
189. 449 P.2d 856 (Or. 1969).
190. Id. at 858.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Garrett, 449 P.2d at 860.
194. In re Stull's Estate, 39 A. 16 (Pa. 1898) (marriage in Maryland for the express purpose
of evading the Pennsylvania paramour law); Maurer v. Maurer, 60 A.2d 440 (Pa. Super. CL 1948)
(same).
195. In re Stull's Estate, 39 A. 16 (Pa. 1898); Maurer v. Maurer, 60 A.2d 440 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1948).
196. Stull, 39 A. at 17; Maurer, 60 A.2d at 442. Another case, Commonwealth v. Custer, 21
A.2d 524, (Pa. Super. CL 1941), noted that the result in Stull was reached because "a personal
incapacity to marry anywhere had been imposed by statute and the very living together of the par-
ties was contrary to good morals." Id. at 526.
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policy, and was done to evade Pennsylvania law."9 A third case,
United States v. Rodgers,'" held that a marriage between Russian
Jews, who were uncle and niece, although valid in Russia, was invalid
in Pennsylvania.'" Pennsylvania statutes forbade such a marriage as
incestuous and the court concluded that:
[w]hatever may be the standard of conduct in another country, the moral
sense of this community would undoubtedly be shocked at the spectacle of
an uncle and niece living together as husband and wife; and I am, of course,
bound to regard the standard that prevails here, and to see that such an objec-
tionable example is not presented to the public."
Despite these cases, in other Pennsylvania cases, the courts did not
turn to public policy to validate out-of-state marriages. In Schofield v.
Schofield,"' one party to a marriage between first cousins sought to
have the marriage declared void.' The two had left Pennsylvania to
evade its law disallowing such marriages and went to Delaware to mar-
ry.' Finding that the general rule pointed toward validation and that
"infinite mischief and confusion" would result from a contrary rule,'
the court found only two exceptions to the general rule.' First, the
rule would not be applied to sustain a polygamous marriage or one
considered by all civilized nations to be incestuous or immoral.'
Second, an exception existed when positive law forbade an individual
from contracting marriage by language indicating an intent to impose
the incapacity on those outside the state or where the marriage is be-
tween relatives of a certain degree and the law expressly disallows it
because the marriage would be "contrary to God's law."' The court
applied these principles to find that the incest statute did not expressly
prohibit individuals from contracting first-cousin marriages outside the
state nor did it render cohabitation by first-cousins unlawful in the
197. Stull, 39 A. at 18. The Maurer court determined that the marriage should not be recog-
nized, in accord with the First Restatement, for violating the positive law of the state. Maurer, 60
A.2d at 442.
198. 109 F. 886 (E.D. Pa. 1901).
199. Id. at 888.
200. Id.
201. 51 Pa. Super. 564 (1912).
202. Id. at 567.
203. Id.
204. Id at 568.
205. Schofield, 51 Pa. Super. at 658.
206. Id. at 570.
207. Id. This second exception was limited to situations where the statute forbids an indi-
vidual from entering a certain type of marriage based on expediency rather than morals.
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state.?
In a recent case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court used the Second
Restatement to determine whether an out-of-state marriage was val-
id.20 The case arose when a widow attempted to avail herself of cer-
tain estate tax benefits.2t0 The parties had gone to West Virginia to
marry after the wife was divorced on grounds of adultery. 1' West
Virginia law did not prohibit the marriage but a Pennsylvania statute
prohibited any person from marrying a co-respondent in adultery while
the ex-spouse who was the "victim" of the adultery was still living.212
The court said:
there is a strong policy favoring uniformity of result [in out-of-state marriage
recognition cases]. In an age of widespread travel and ease of mobility, it
would create inordinate confusion and defy the reasonable expectations of the
citizens whose marriage is valid in one state to hold that marriage invalid
elsewhere." 3
Against this strong policy in favor of recognizing out-of-state marriag-
es, the court balanced the particular policy behind the prohibition of
such marriages in Pennsylvania to determine whether recognition for
the limited purpose of receiving the tax benefit was appropriate.
214
Because denial of the tax exemption would not deter adulterous con-
duct or spare the aggrieved former spouse an affront, the court found
that the policy in favor of recognition should prevail.2 5
K. Rhode Island
Rhode Island is another state that asserts a public policy exception
exists but it has not used that exception to invalidate out-of-state mar-
208. Id. at 576.
209. In re Estate of Lenherr, 314 A.2d 255 (Pa. 1974).
210. Id.
211. Id. at 256-57.
212. 48 PA. CONSL. STAT. § 169 (repealed 1990).
213. In re Estate of Lenherr, 314 A.2d at 258.
214. Id. The court did not reach the question of whether the marriage was valid for all pur-
poses. For a discussion of the difference between recognizing marriages for all purposes and rec-
ognizing them only for the purpose of granting a particular incident of marriage, see Hans W.
Baade, Marriage and Divorce in American Conflicts Law: Governmental-Interests Analysis and
the Restatement (Second), 72 COLUM. L. REv. 329, 356-57 (1972); David E. Engdahl, Proposal
for a Benign Revolution in Marriage Law and Marriage Conflicts Law, 55 IOwA L. REv. 108-10
(1969); and J. David Fine, The Application of Issue-Analysis to Choice of Law Involving Family
Law Matters in the United States, 26 Loy. L. REv. 31 (1980). For a discussion of the problems
that would occur if this incident-by-incident analysis were used to determine the validity of mar-
riages by same-sex couples, see Cox, Choice of Law, supra note 12, at 1063 n.168.
215. In re Estate of Lenherr, 314 A.2d at 259.
[Vol. 16:61
riages in violation of its own statutory provisions. In Ex Parte
Chace,16 the court considered an out-of-state marriage by a ward
who was prevented from marrying by his guardian. The ward went to
Massachusetts, married, and returned to Rhode Island with his wife." '
The court held that "the capacity or incapacity to marry depends on the
law of the place where the marriage is celebrated, and not on that of
the domicile of the parties."2 '8 The court went on to say that the
well-recognized exception to [this] general rule that if a marriage is odious
by the common consent or nations, or its influence is thought dangerous to
the fabric of society, so that it is strongly against the public policy of the
jurisdiction, it will not be recognized there, even though valid where it was
solemnized.2 19
The court held that the marriage in this case was valid because it was
not "so subversive of good morals, or so threatening to the fabric of
society ... ."' Thus, Rhode Island was willing to recognize the val-
idly contracted marriage, even though in evasion of the marriage laws
of the parties' domicile, because
all nations have consented, or must be presumed to consent, for the common
benefit and advantage, that such marriages should be good or not, according
to the laws of the country where they are made .... By observing this law
no inconvenience can arise; but infinite mischief will ensue if it is not.2
L. Conclusion
As can be seen from the review of cases above, only rarely did
the courts in any state invoke the public policy exception to avoid
using the general rule to validate marriages entered into by their
domiciliaries out-of-state. Even in cases where the marriages were
prohibited within the states as incestuous, adulterous, lacking permis-
sion to marry, or underage, the courts still validated the out-of-state
marriages. That such marriages violated the states' own marriage stat-
utes was not dispositive in any of the courts' decisions whether to
recognize the out-of-state marriage. Even though they were fully aware
of the public policy exception, and usually referred to it in their deci-
sions, the courts did not turn to the exception to prevent what were
216. 26 R.I. 351 (1904).
217. Id. at 352.
218. Id. at 354.
219. Id. at 356. Examples of "odious" are polygamy and incest.
220. Ex Parte Chace, 26 R.I. at 357.
221. Id. at 355.
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intentional, knowing decisions by domiciliaries to violate their state's
public policy as expressed by its marriage statutes.
By examining the courts' efforts to avoid invalidation, what is
clear is that the courts are reluctant, and reasonably so, to invalidate a
marriage. Considering all the policy reasons behind the general rule,
such as protecting the parties' expectations, providing stability, protect-
ing children, needing to know whether one is married or not, and
avoiding uncertainty about one's marital status during litigation to de-
termine it, we should be relieved that the courts have not easily turned
to a policy exception to refuse to recognize an otherwise valid mar-
riage. Our federalist system of co-equal and related sovereigns should
lead us to expect this benefit. The only question that remains is wheth-
er the courts will continue to be reluctant to invalidate out-of-state
marriages when those marriages are entered into by same-sex couples.
It would be naive to expect that courts will not immediately reach for
the public policy exception as a way to avoid recognizing marriages by
same-sex couples; while one can say much about those of us who do
battle for gay and lesbian civil rights, it is difficult to call us naive. But
it may be possible, and partially as a result of the discussion we are
having here today, to convince a court to remain steadfast, as courts
before it have remained steadfast when faced with other out-of-state
marriages that they concluded did not violate public policy.
Given the lengths that the courts have gone to avoid finding that
marriages do violate public policy, it may be possible to convince
courts to make the same efforts to validate marriages by same-sex
couples. In states that do not prohibit marriage by same-sex couples, it
would be disingenuous to conclude that those out-of-state marriages are
against public policy when courts have found other out-of-state mar-
riages which were prohibited by statute do not violate public policy.
Even in states which do prohibit marriage by same-sex couples, those
out-of-state marriages are no more against public policy than other out-
of-state marriages which were also prohibited by statute but were found
not to violate public policy. The precedent examined above provides
strong support to advocate that, using the public policy exception now,
when it has never or only rarely been used before, violates the state's
clear choice of law rules and should be unconstitutional under an equal
protection analysis.
III. How HAVE COURTS USED STATUTORY PROHIBITIONS TO
DETERMINE WHETHER AN OUT-OF-STATE MARRIAGE WAS VALID?
When courts have refused to validate an out-of-state marriage by
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their domiciliaries, they have frequently been in states that have mar-
riage evasion statutes and the marriage was statutorily prohibited. Of
states without marriage evasion statutes, only New Jersey has repeated-
ly used the public policy exception to refuse recognition of marriages
in violation of its own statutory prohibitions. The only consistent ex-
ception can be found in those states that refused to recognize interracial
marriages which violated their anti-miscegenation statutes. Thus, it was
not a public policy exception per se that lead these courts to refuse to
recognize the out-of-state marriages; instead, it was use of their mar-
riage evasion statutes or prohibitions in their own marriage statutes that
led courts to refuse recognition. Reviewing the cases leads to the con-
clusion that only in the face of statutory demands, and specifically only
when ordered to do so by a marriage evasion statute, do courts refuse
to validate the otherwise valid marriages entered into out-of-state by
their domiciliaries. Even with such evasion statutes, courts do not con-
sistently use them to refuse to recognize otherwise valid out-of-state
marriages.
Until the recent wave of legislation attempting to prevent recogni-
tion of marriages by same-sex couples should they be permitted in the
future,'m the modem trend has been away from prohibiting evasion of
marriage statutes.'m In fact, the evasion statutes reflect a policy of de-
clining strength."4 The Uniform Marriage Evasion Act was with-
drawn' as inconsistent with the comity rule contained in the Uni-
form Marriage and Divorce Act.' "The comity rule under the Act
also does not incorporate the 'strong public policy' exception, suggest-
ing a developing trend away from that exception."' Given the de-
222. For a list of states that have passed such statutes, see Cox, Anti-Gay Initiatives, supra
note 12.
223. See Koppelman, supra note 32.
224. See id.
225. UNIFORM MARRIAGE & DIVORCE AcT § 210, 9A U.L.A. 176, cmL at 177 (1987).
226. Id. § 210, cmlt. at 176.
227. Leszinske v. Poole, 798 P.2d 1049, 1054 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990). In this interesting case,
a divorced father appealed an order awarding the mother primary physical custody of the parties'
three children, despite the mother's remarriage to her uncle in Costa Rica. Id at 1050-51 Although
both New Mexico and California (the two states with significant relationships with the marriage
under the Second Restatement analysis) outlawed the relationship as incestuous, the court held that
even though the penal statutes indicate the marriage is against the public policy of the states,
"[n]evertheless, the dispositive question is whether the marriage offends a sufficiently strong pub-
lic policy to outweigh the purposes served by the rule of comity." Id. at 1055. Finding that the
California courts would use a test for public policy that asks whether "the marriage is considered
odious by the common consent of nations or whether such marriages are against the laws of na-
ture," the court said it was difficult to conclude that such marriages violated public policy because
twenty-three South and Central American and northern European nations recognize such marriag-
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cline in evasion statutes, it would challenge that trend to find a sudden
upsurge both in the passage and use of marriage evasion statutes.'
The question of whether to recognize marriages by same-sex couples
may lead to the same situation as occurred in the 1930's and 1940's
when divorce became more prevalent and states convulsed over wheth-
er and in what circumstances to permit their domiciliaries to remarry.
A. District of Columbia
Even in states with evasion statutes, the courts have been far from
consistent in their use of those statutes as a basis for invalidating out-
of-state marriages by their domiciliaries. For example, the Supreme
Court held that the District of Columbia's marriage evasion statute ap-
plied "solely to marriages void, because incestuous or polygamous, and
to those which are voidable, because entered into by a person who was
a lunatic, under the age of consent, or impotent, and those which are
voidable because procured by force or fraud." 9 However, in that
case, despite a statutory prohibition against adulterers remarrying, the
Court held that D.C. had to recognize the remarriage of an adulteress in
another state." In a later case, despite the Supreme Court's reference
in Loughran to underage marriage as one covered by the marriage
evasion statute,"' the D.C. Municipal Court of Appeals did not use
the evasion statute to invalidate such a marriage. 2 In this case, a
couple under the age of legal marriage got married in Virginia by lying
about their ages. 3 Although prohibited statutorily in D.C., the court
held that this type of marriage was "voidable" and not "void ab initio,"
thus it had the discretion to recognize the marriage." The U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia reached a similar conclusion in
Hitchens v. Hitchens,"5 where an underage female married a male in
es. Id. at 1055-56.
228. See Koppelman, supra, note 32.
229. Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U.S. 216, 224 (1934). In making this holding, the court
relied on the statutory prohibitions contained in the marriage evasion statute, D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 1287 (1901):
If any marriage declared illegal by the aforegoing sections shall be entered into in
another jurisdiction by persons having and retaining their domicile in the District of
Columbia, such marriage shall be deemed illegal, and may be decreed to be void in
said District in the same manner as if it had been celebrated therein.
Loughran, 292 U.S. at 224.
230. Loughran, 292 U.S. at 224.
231. Id.
232. Duley v. Duley, 151 A.2d 255. 257 (D.C. 1959).
233. Id. at 256.
234. Id. at 257.
235. 47 F. Supp. 73 (D.D.C. 1942).
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Maryland without the consent of her parents.' Although valid under
Maryland law, it was prohibited by D.C. law and D.C.'s evasion statute
purports to give such marriages the same effect as if they had been
entered into within the District.237 Finding that such marriages were
not "repugnant and void," the court concluded that the better rule




Illinois has used both its evasion statute and general public policy
to refuse to recognize marriages that violate its statutory prohibitions.
In the only case interpreting its evasion statute, 4° the court refused to
recognize a marriage when the parties were first cousins who were
Illinois residents.24' They went to Kentucky for the sole purpose of
evading the law of Illinois, which prohibits marriages between first
cousins and renders such marriages incestuous and void.242
In an earlier non-evasion statute case, the court reached the same
conclusion concerning the Indiana marriage of a couple who was un-
able to marry in Illinois for a year following one of the parties' di-
vorce.23 The court stated that the general rule is that the marriage of
citizens of one state celebrated in another state, which is valid in the
latter state, is recognized as valid in the domicile, except when incestu-
ous according to the recognized belief of Christian nations, polyga-
mous, or declared by positive law to have no validity in the domiciliary
state.' The court then cited Wilson v. Cook, 5 which held that to
recognize the validity of a marriage "celebrated by crossing the state
line to evade the laws of [Illinois] would render legislation futile and
236. d at 77.
237. Id. at 75.
238. Id.
239. Hitchens, 47 F. Supp. at 77.
240. 750 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 5/216 states:
[tihat if any person residing and intending to continue to reside in this state and who is
disabled or prohibited from contracting marriage under the laws of this state, shall go
into another state or country and there contract a marriage prohibited and declared void
by the laws of this state, such marriage shall be null and void for all purposes in this
state with the same effect as though such prohibited marriage had been entered into in
this tate.
241. Whelan v. Whelan, 105 N.E. 2d 314, 316 (111. App. Ct. 1952).
242. Id. at 315-16.
243. Stevens v. Stevens, 136 N.E. 785, 786-87 (1l. 1922).
244. l at 786.
245. 100 N.E. 222 (Ill. 1912).
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ascribe practical imbecility to the legislature .... 2  Because the ap-
pellee violated the required statutory waiting period, the court conclud-
ed that the marriage was invalid. 7 The Illinois courts reached the
same result in refusing to recognize a claimed Colorado common law
marriage between two Illinois residents.' The court stated that
"where a state has ... a positive policy of the state for the protection
of the morals and good order of society against serious social evils, a
marriage contracted in disregard of the statutory prohibition, wherever
celebrated, will be void in the state of domicile."'49 Because both par-
ties were domiciled in Illinois at the time of the alleged common law
marriage, the court refused to recognize the marriage.'
C. Mississippi
In Mississippi, the court has interpreted its marriage evasion stat-
ute narrowly."' Mississippi's evasion statute only refers to marriages
outside the state which attempt to evade the state's incest prohibi-
tions. 2 When a defendant was indicted for marrying his mother-in-
law in an alleged violation of section 458 of the 1942 Mississippi
Code, 3 the court held that since the criminal statute did not prohibit
this particular marriage, criminal statutes were strictly construed in
favor of the defendant, and the marriage evasion statute did not apply
to void the marriage.' Two attempts to use the marriage evasion
statute to apply to interracial marriages were held to be invalid because
the marriage evasion statute applied, by its terms, only to marriages
that are incestuous and neither interracial marriage fit within that pro-
hibition.z5 In interpreting its prohibition against members of different
246. Stevens, 135 N.E. at 786.
247. 1L at 787.
248. In re Estate of Enoch, 201 N.E. 2d 682, 689 (IM. 1964).
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. See Ratcliffe v. State, 107 So. 2d 728 (Miss. 1958); Rose v. State, 107 So. 2d 730 (Miss.
1958); State v. Winslow, 45 So. 2d 574 (Miss. 1950).
252. Mtss. CODE ANN. § 93-1-3 (1994) ("Any attempt to evade section 93-1-1 [incest prohi-
bitions] by marrying out of this state and returning to it shall be within the prohibitions of said
section.").
253. Miss. CODE ANN. § 458 stated.
The father shall not many his son's widow; a man shall not marry his wife's daughter,
or his wife's daughter's daughter, or his wife's son's daughter, or the daughter of his
brother or sister, and the like prohibition shall extend to females in the same degrees;
and all marriages prohibited by this and the preceding section are incestuous and void.
254. State v. Winslow, 45 So. 2d 574, 575-76 (Miss. 1950).
255. Ratcliffe v. State, 107 So. 2d 728, 730 (Miss. 1958); Rose v. State, 107 So. 2d 730, 731
(Miss. 1958). The defendants in both cases were convicted under § 2000 of the Mississippi Code
which stated that "persons whose marriage is prohibited by law by reason or race or blood and
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races from marrying, the court noted that the policy behind the prohi-
bition was to "prevent persons of white and negro blood from living
together as husband and wife in Mississippi." Since that policy was
not affected by recognizing an interracial marriage validly contracted in
Illinois, the court agreed to recognize the marriage "to the extent only
of permitting one of the parties thereto to inherit from the other prop-
erty in Mississippi...
D. New Jersey
New Jersey is an interesting state. It does not have a marriage
evasion statute but its courts protect its statutory marriage requirements
in the same way that courts do in states with evasion statutes. New
Jersey's courts consistently invalidate statutorily prohibited marriages
entered into out-of-state by its domiciliaries just as courts do in states
with evasion statutes. When faced with non-statutorily prohibited mar-
riages, however, its courts react like virtually all other courts--they
validate the out-of-state marriages by their domiciliaries.
In two cases in 1957 and 1958, the Appellate Courts of New
Jersey struck down their domiciliaries foreign marriages because each
of them violated a New Jersey statute regulating marriage. In Bucca v.
State,"s the plaintiff brought an action to obtain a judgment declaring
that his marriage to his niece in Italy, in accordance with a dispensa-
tion granted under Italian law, was entitled to full recognition in New
Jersey and that any subsequent cohabitation with her would not consti-
tute incest."9 The court found that the marriage violated New Jersey's
laws against incest' and was invalid. 1 The court stated the gener-
al rule that a marriage valid where celebrated is valid everywhere, but
held that "[e]xceptions to the general rule are ... marriages prohibited
by the public acts of the forum for reasons of local distinctive policy
which marriage is declared to be incestuous and void, who shall cohabitate shall be guilty of a
felony." Ratcliffe, 107 So. 2d at 729; Rose, 107 So. 2d at 731. Because the defendants had been
charged with cohabiting in a relationship that was incestuous and void, they were not convicted
because the incest statute, and hence the evasion statute, did not apply to them, even though they
were violating the anti-miscegenation statute. Ratcliff, 107 So.2d at 729; Rose, 107 So. 2d at 731
(citing Miss. CODE ANN. § 2000 (1956)).
256. Miller v. Lucks, 36 So. 2d 140, 142 (Miss. 1948).
257. Id. at 142. The court noted that its decision "in accord with the holding of courts of
other states faced with this negro problem." Id.
258. 128 A.2d 506 (NJ. Ch. 1957).
259. 1la
260. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 37: 1-1 (West 1968).
261. Bucca, 128 A.2d at 510-11.
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... v262 The court held that "the recognition of the marriage as valid
by the State of New Jersey would be contrary to the public policy of
this State."
In Wilkins v. Zelichowski,264 the plaintiff sought the annulment of
her marriage to the defendant on the grounds that she was under eigh-
teen at the time of the marriage in violation of New Jersey Statutes
Annotated section 2A: 34-1(e),2' the statute requiring parental con-
sent for minor females to marry.2' Plaintiff was under seventeen
when she married. Although the superior court appellate division re-
fused to allow her to annul the marriage, the supreme court re-
versed.2' Speaking very clearly to the public policy exception, the
court held:
While that State [Indiana] was interested in the formal ceremonial require-
ments of the marriage, it had no interest whatever in [the] marital status of
the parties. Indeed, New Jersey was the only State having any interest in that
status, for both the parties were domiciled in New Jersey before and after the
marriage and their matrimonial domicile was established here. The purpose in
having the ceremony take place in Indiana was to evade New Jersey's mar-
riage policy and we see no just or compelling reason for permitting it to
succeed... .' The authority of a state to decide what marriages it will rec-
ognize is beyond question .... and if it is repugnant to the public policy of
the domiciliary state, that state, through its courts, has the power to annul
it.2
Despite these two examples, in several other cases, the New Jersey
appellate courts have held that the validity of a marriage is governed
by the state of celebration.' They did that consistently when no New
Jersey statute prohibited the marriage and when the marriage was oth-
erwise valid where celebrated.
262. Id. at 508.
263. 128 A.2d at 510-11.
264. 140 A.2d 65 (NJ. 1958).
265. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 34-1 (West 1987).
266. Id.
267. Id at 69.
268. Id. at 68 (citations omitted).
269. Id. (quoting Sirois v. Sirois, 50 A.2d 88, 89 (N.H. 1946)).
270. Clark v. Clark, 30 A. 81 (NJ. 1894); Smith v. Smith, 19 A. 255 (NJ. Super. CL 1889);
Bolmer v. Edsall, 106 A. 646 (NJ. Ch. 1919); Capossa v. Colonna, 122 A. 378 (NJ. Ch. 1923);
see also McMorrow v. Schweiker, 561 F. Supp. 584, 590 (D.NJ. 1982) holding:
mhe law of New Jersey has long been that the form or method of contracting a mar-
riage is regulated by the law of the sovereign where the marriage takes place, and if
the marriage is valid there its validity is everywhere recognized .... This rule does
not apply to polygamous or incestuous marriages ....
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E. North Dakota
In North Dakota, the state has a statute that is a combination of
marriage validation and evasion statute."' In 1955, the North Dakota
Supreme Court held that a marriage that was prohibited within North
Dakota due to the female's mental incompetence could not be legally
entered into by leaving the state and going to Minnesota.' The court
stated "the domicile of the parties being in this state and the marriage
being prohibited by the law in this state, our statutes will be applied
and will govern the court in determining and decreeing the nullity of
the marriage. '"' In a related case, however, the court validated a
Minnesota marriage by two North Dakota domiciliaries even though the
marriage license was obtained by fraud."4 The court focused on the
validation portion of the statute, not the evasion portion, and found that
"if such marriage is valid under the laws of Minnesota, then such mar-
riage is recognized as valid in this state." 275
F. Utah
Utah has also used a statutory prohibition to refuse to recognize an
out-of-state marriage by its domiciliaries, despite its marriage validation
statute."6 The Utah Supreme Court carved out an exception to the
marriage validation law to refuse to recognize a legal common law
271. N.D. CENT. CODE §14-03-08 (1991) tited "Foreign Marriages Recognized" states that:
[A]II marriages contracted outside of this state, which are valid according to the laws.
of the state or country where contracted, are valid in this state. This section does not
apply when residents of this state contract a marriage in another state which is pro-
hibited under the laws of North Dakota.
272. First Nat'l Bank In Grand Forks v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 68
N.W.2d 661 (N.D. 1955).
273. Id. at 664.
274. Johnson v. Johnson, 104 N.W.2d 8, 17 (N.D. 1960).
275. Id. at 17-18.
276. In re Vetas, 170 P.2d 183 (1946). At the time of the case, the Utah validation statute
stated that "marriages solemnized in any other country, state, or territory, if valid where solem-
nized, are valid here." UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-4 (1953). Since then, the Utah legislature was the
first to amend their validation statute to refuse recognition of marriages by same-sex couples. H.B.
366, 51st Leg. (Utah 1995). House Bill 366 amended section 30-1-4 so that it now states: "mar-
riages solemnized in any country, state, or territory, if valid where solemnized are valid here un-
less it is a marriage 1) that would he prohibited and declared void in this state under subsection
30-1-2 subsections (1), (3), or (5); or 2) between parties who are related to each other within and
including three degrees of consanguinity." UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-4 (Supp. 1996). Section 30-1-
2 states that "[t]he following marriages are prohibited and declared void: (1) there is a husband or
wife living,.... (3) the male or female is under age 14,... or (5) the parties are of the same
sex." UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-2 (Supp. 1996).
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marriage in Idaho.' Because at the time Utah did not recognize
common law marriages, the courts refused to apply the validation stat-
ute.' Using section 132 of the First Restatement, the court stated
that foreign marriages by domiciliaries were invalid if a domicile stat-
ute makes it void.' The court asserted that the public policy behind
the solemnization requirement is to protect the rights of the parties to
the marriage as well as third parties.'
G. Wisconsin
Wisconsin also has a marriage evasion statute,"' which its courts
have repeatedly used to refuse to recognize marriages entered into in
violation of it. For example, in Lanham v. Lanham,m the court held
that a Wisconsin couple who traveled to Michigan to avoid the Wis-
consin statutory prohibition of remarriage within one year of divorce
was not validly married in Wisconsin.' The court explicitly deter-
mined that "the Legislature deemed that it was against public policy
and good morals that divorced persons should be at liberty to immedi-
ately contract new marriages." The court held that the legislature
was clearly concerned with public policy in creating this prohibition,
that the only means to further this public policy was to declare the
Michigan marriage as void, and that the statutory restriction against
277. In re Vetas, 170 P.2d 183 (Utah 1946).
278. UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-2 (1995) lists persons who are qualified to validly solemnize a
marriage. The refusal to recognize common-law marriages from other states has been lifted by
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-4.5 (Supp. 1996) which validates common law marriages upon a judicial
finding. Id.
279. In re Vetas, 170 P.2d at 185 (Utah 1946) (citing FIRST RESTATEMENT § 132(d)).
280. Id. at 186.
281. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 765.04 (West 1993). Parts (1) and (2) of the statute state:
(1) If any person residing and intending to continue to reside in this state who is dis-
abled or prohibited from contracting marriage under the laws of this state goes into
another state or country and there contracts a marriage prohibited or declared void
under the laws of this state, such marriage shall be void for all purposes in this state
with the same effect as though it had been entered into in this state.
(2) Proof that a person contracting a marriage in another jurisdiction was (a) domiciled
in this state within 12 months prior to the marriage, and resumed residence in this state
within 18 months after the date of departure therefrom, or (b) at all times after depar-
ture from this state, and until returning maintained a place of residence within this
state, shall be prima facie evidence that at the time such marriage was contracted the
person resided and intended to reside in this state.
The penalty for evading this statute is a fine of between $200-1,000. See Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 765.30(l)(a) (West 1993).
282. 117 N.W. 787 (Wis. 1908). This case was decided before the Wisconsin evasion statute
was passed in 1915 but numerous evasion statutes cases have cited its public policy discussion.
283. Id. at 789.
284. Id. at 788.
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remarriage within a year after a divorce was intended to apply to Wis-
consin citizens extraterritorially.' The court reached the same result
when a couple left Wisconsin to marry in Illinois, which did not have a
restriction, contrary to Wisconsin, against epileptics marrying.' The
Wisconsin Supreme Court refused to apply the evasion statute to void
marriages when the party seeking annulment had not brought the an-
nulment action within the ten-year statute of limitations," 7 and when
the marriage did not meet certain statutory procedural requirements.
H. Conclusion
This review of cases indicates that even when a state has a mar-
riage evasion statute prohibiting its residents from leaving the state to
avoid its laws and going to another state to marriage, the courts are not
consistent in finding such marriages to be invalid. Like the general
public policy exception cases above, the courts explore the public poli-
cy behind the domicile's prohibition of marriage within the state and
consider that policy in determining whether the marriage is invalid
under the evasion statute.
IV. CONCLUSION
Having examined countless cases considering both public policy
exceptions and marriage evasion statutes, it is difficult to believe that
either should have significant impact on whether marriages by same-
sex couples will be recognized. This review shows that courts, although
regularly referring to a public policy exception which would permit
them to refuse to recognize out-of-state marriage, have rarely done so.
Even in states with marriage evasion statutes, the results are not at all
consistent in whether a court will use the evasion statute to invalidate
the marriage or will side-step the statute to validate the marriage.
While this inconsistency does not give same-sex couples any guaran-
tees that their marriages will be recognized in their domiciliary state, it
does lead one to expect that many courts should validate these marriag-
es. For courts to suddenly become consistent in invoking public policy
against marriages by same-sex couples when they have not done so for
marriages that violate the state's own marriage statutes would indicate
285. Id. at 789.
286. In re Canon's Estate, 266 N.W. 918 (Wis. 1936).
287. Ginkowski v. Ginkowski, 137 N.W.2d 403 (Wis. 1965). The court held that the marriage
had ripened into a valid, binding marriage because of the lapse of time and the operation of law.
Id. at 406.
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that they are refusing to follow precedent and are using anti-gay ani-
mus, rather than choice of law theory and precedent, to support such a
change in result.

